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The Changing
Landscape

E

xpectation turns to the Supreme
Court as it once more takes up
a free speech dispute about billboard regulation. On June 28, 2021, the
Court granted the City of Austin’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Reagan
National Advertising of Austin, Inc. v. City
of Austin, 972 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020),
in which the Fifth Circuit struck down
the city’s ban on digitizing off-premises
signs. Billboards have a long history of
legal contention, and billboard intolerance is historic. Billboards have their
place, but they can overpower the aesthetic environment and threaten traffic
safety. Before they were regulated at
the beginning of the 20th century, billboards overwhelmed rural and urban
areas with massive structures that
dominated the landscape. Concern
about safety issues and an influential
aesthetic movement led to stricter controls. They included sign ordinances
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that prohibited billboards, which courts
upheld in early cases. Digital billboards
with moving, lighted displays create
new problems. They differ from traditional billboards, which have static
displays that can be changed manually
but do not move.
Local governments regulate signs,
and sign ordinances decide what,
when, and how signage speech may
occur. Free speech doctrine intervenes
and mediates government interests in
billboard regulation, which creates two
important free speech issues. Billboard
speech is usually commercial speech,
which has received less protection
under the free speech clause. Sign ordinances also make distinctions between
billboards, regulated as off-premise
signs, and business signs, regulated as
on-premise signs, which can create free
speech problems.
This article summaries the current application of constitutional free
speech doctrine to billboard regulation.
For a more extensive analysis of this
topic by the author, see the author’s
recent article published in the Real
Property, Trust & Estate Law Journal.

Daniel R. Mandelker, Billboards, Signs,
Free Speech, and the First Amendment, 55
Real Prop., Tr. & Estate L.J. 367 (2020)
Commercial Speech, Central
Hudson, and Metromedia
The leading case on commercial
speech, Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), adopted four
criteria to decide whether a restriction
on commercial speech is constitutional:
For commercial speech to come
within [the First Amendment],
[1] it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. [2] Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, [3] we must
determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4]
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest. [Bracketed numbers
supplied]
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Commercial messages connected with a site
were no more valuable than noncommercial
messages, and noncommercial messages
located where commercial messages are
allowed were not more threatening to traffic
safety and the beauty of the city.

White’s treatment of the fourth Central Hudson criterion. He disposed of
it quickly, holding that if the city has
a “sufficient basis” for believing that
billboards are traffic hazards and unattractive, “then obviously the most
direct and perhaps the only effective
approach” is to exclude them.
The third “directly advance” Central
Hudson criterion presented “the more
serious question,” but Justice White
had little difficulty finding compliance
as a matter of law. For traffic safety, he
said, “[w]e likewise hesitate to disagree
with the accumulated, common-sense
judgments of local lawmakers and of
the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards
to traffic safety.” He reached a “similar result” with respect to the aesthetic
justification: “It is not speculative to
recognize that billboards by their very
nature, wherever located and however
constructed, can be perceived as an
‘esthetic harm.’” The ordinance directly
advanced the governmental interests he
approved.
Provisions in the ordinance that
prohibited off-premise but allowed
on-premise signs raised more difficult
problems. They defined off-premise

signs as signs advertising goods and
services not available on the premises,
and on-premise signs as signs offering goods and services available on the
premises. These definitions are typical, but they endangered the ordinance
because they are content-based, and
because allowing on-premise while
prohibiting off-premise signs arguably
undercuts the aesthetic purpose of the
ordinance.
Justice White’s response was mixed.
He held the different treatment of
on-premise signs did not make the ordinance underinclusive by undermining
its protection of aesthetic character.
Allowing on-premise signs was justified, did not denigrate the city’s interest
in traffic safety and beauty, and did
not defeat its own case. As a matter of
law, billboards, with their “periodically
changing content,” presented a more
acute problem than on-premise signs.
The city could “reasonably conclude”
that a business has a stronger interest
in identifying and advertising its business than in advertising businesses
elsewhere. The ordinance reflected
the city’s decision that its interest in
on-premise advertising was stronger
than its interest in traffic safety and

aesthetics.
Justice White struck down the provision that allowed on-premise signs to
advertise goods and services available
on the premises because it discriminated against commercial speech.
Commercial messages connected with
a site were no more valuable than
noncommercial messages, and noncommercial messages located where
commercial messages are allowed were
not more threatening to traffic safety
and the beauty of the city. He did not
consider a possible content neutrality
issue.
He also held unconstitutional a
group of exceptions to the off-premise sign prohibition because they
permitted only a limited number of
noncommercial signs. Other noncommercial signs were prohibited. Some of
the permitted signs were content-based,
though some were not, but Justice
White did not consider the content
neutrality issue. Though not entirely
favorable, Metromedia brought in an era
in which courts generally accepted billboard regulation.
Reed and Reagan National
The legal landscape changed when
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